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Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 13-14 (3d ed. 1994) 14 
2014, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Reimbursement Incentive which 
delegated authority to an Economic Advisory Council C'EAC") within the Idaho Department of 
Commerce to grant tax subsidies to businesses that established an office in Idaho and created at 
least 20 new jobs. Under the Act, the EAC is granted broad discretion to grant or deny tax 
credits to businesses; the Act also strictly limits judicial review of agency action. 
In 2016, the EAC granted a tax credit of $6.5 million to Paylocity, an Illinois 
Corporation. Paylocity is a direct competitor of Employers Resource Management Company, an 
Idaho Corporation ("Employers"). By providing a $6.5 million government subsidy to Paylocity, 
the EAC will cover a substantial portion of Paylocity's overhead and operating expenses, giving 
Paylocity a competitive advantage over Employers in attracting and servicing Idaho business. 
To compete with Paylocity, Employers will have to match or beat the fees Paylocity charges for 
its services, but without the benefit of a multi-million dollar government subsidy. 
Employers filed this lawsuit, asserting standing as a business "competitor" aggrieved by 
arbitrary executive agency action, to challenge the Legislature's delegation of discretionary 
authority to the EAC to issue tax credits to selected Idaho businesses. 
The Idaho Constitution empowers the Legislature, and it alone, to create tax policy for 
the state of Idaho and ensure the uniform application of Idaho's tax laws. The Legislature can 
delegate the administration of tax laws to executive agencies. However, by authorizing the EAC 
to waive taxes levied on selected companies, without strictly limiting the discretion that EAC 
selecting those companies, and by limiting judicial review the EAC's '"""'~h,,,v 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
This appeal is taken from an order granting the Defendant's '""""" to -,.J,uu,., for 
standing and judgment thereon. Employers filed its Complaint on March 2016. Defendant 
Megan Ronk is the Director of the Idaho Department of Commerce and was named in her 
official capacity in the Complaint On May 4, 2016, the Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss 
for lack of standing. On May 20, 2016, Employers filed its Opposition to the Defendant's motion. 
The Defendant's Reply Memorandum was filed on July 15, 2016. The Court set the motion for 
hearing on July 20, 2016. Employers filed a Motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint on 
May 26, 2016. At the hearing on July 20, 2016, the District Court granted ERMC's Motion to 
file an Amended Complaint On July 26, 2016, the Order granting to file an amended 
complaint was entered by the Court and Employer's Amended Complaint was filed. On August 
1, 2016, the Defendant renewed its Motion to Dismiss and a hearing was held on August 2, 2016. 
At that hearing, the State objected to the inclusion of Paragraph 10 and the attached 
Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint, which the Court struck. At the conclusion of the hearing 
on the State's Motion to Dismiss, the Court took the matter under advisement and rendered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing on August 
15, 2016. A judgment of dismissal was entered on August 15, 2016, from which this Appeal was 
taken. Notice of Appeal was filed and served on September 19, 2016. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Article III, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides: "The legislative power of the state shall 
vested in a senate and that 
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state 
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no 
person or collection of persons charged with the of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any 
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this 
constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
l 
The Idaho Constitution vests all taxing power in the Legislature. This plenary authority of 
the Legislature is not delegable, and 
and unguided taxing power. 
Idaho Constitution forbids a delegation of unrestricted 
The Legislature exercises its taxing power subject to Article VII, §5 of the Idaho 
Constitution, which states that "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects[and] 
the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall seem 
necessary and just 
The Idaho Department Commerce is an agency within Idaho 
State Governrnent Pursuant to Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, all agencies within the 
executive branch are prohibited from exercising any of the powers reserved to the legislative or 
the judicial branch Idaho State Government 
In 2014, the Idaho Legislature passed the Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act ("IRV\"), 
which was then amended in 2015. The IRIA authorizes tax credits to be issued by the Director of 
the Department of Commerce to a qualified business entity. qualify for the tax credit, a 
business entity files an application with the Department of Commerce. The application is 
reviewed by the Director to determine if all the information required by the statute is present. 
The completed application is then reviewed by an Economic Advisory ~~~"~'" within 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
business entity claim a tax credit a number 
of new jobs in the state of Idaho. In order to be considered participation, an 
applicant or its designated representative must submit an application to director 
and shall include: 
(a) A complete description of the proposed project and the economic benefit that 
will accrue to the state as a result of the project; 
(b) A description or explanation of whether the project will occur or how it will be 
altered if the tax credit application is denied by the council; 
( c) Proof of a community match; 
( d) A letter from the tax commission confirming that the applicant is in good 
standing in the state of Idaho and is not in unresolved arrears in the payment of 
any state tax or fee administered by the tax commission; 
( e) A detailed statement with an estimate of Idaho goods and services to be 
consumed or purchased by the applicant during the term; 
(f) Known or expected detriments to the state or existing industries the state; 
(g) An anticipated project inception date and proposed schedule of progress; 
(h) Proposed performance requirements and measurements that must be met prior to 
issuance of the tax credit; 
(i) A detailed description of the proposed capital investment; 
G) A detailed description of jobs to be created, an approximation of the number of 
suchjobs to be created and the projected average wage to be paid for such jobs; 
(k) A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be generated by 
the project; 
(l) Identification of any individual or entity included within the application that is 
entitled to a rebate pursuant to section 63-3641 or 63-4408, Idaho Code, or is 
required to obtain a separate seller's permit pursuant to chapter 36, title 63, 
Idaho Code; and 
(m)The federal employer identification or social security number for each individual 
or entity stated as the business entity in the agreement 
Upon satisfaction by the director that all requirements are met pursuant to this 
chapter, the director shall submit such application to the council [Economic Advisory 
Council]. The council shall review the application, may request additional 
information and shall approve or reject the application. An approval or rejection from 
the council shall not be considered a contested case pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit an 
aggrieved applicant from seeking judicial review as provided in chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code. 
OPENING BRIEF 
a tax application, ,n~A.-rM~~,An to 
the the Department of Commerce, is the creation of jobs." In order to claim the 
tax credit, an entity must create a minimum number of new jobs in the state of Idaho. "Minimum 
new jobs" is defined in Idaho Code §67-4738(11) as "not less twenty (20) such jobs over 
the term of the project if created within a rural community, or not less than fifty (50) such jobs 
over the term of the project if created within an urban community." 
Idaho Code §67-4739(1)(a) - (m) specifies information required to be provided as part 
of the tax credit application process. However, in enacting this statute, the Idaho Legislature did 
not establish standards, guidelines, or requirements as to how or information is to be 
process approving an application for issuance of a tax credit Further, the statute 
disapproval of an applicant's request for a tax credit Without standards objective or even 
subjective -- in place, decisions of the EAC are, for all practical purposes, exempt from 
meaningful substantive review by the judicial branch of Idaho State Government 
Idaho Code §67-4739 gives the EAC discretion to grant or an application based on 
its subjective determination of a business's qualifications. The only requirement that is even 
potentially objective is the required number of "new jobs" that a 
qualify for the tax But even that requirement is subject to Department's determination 
that the jobs are in fact "new" and not simply renamed or artificially generated in some other 
What is more to the point is that creating is not 
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V'"''"'" ... " that will accrue to the state as a result 
Proof of a community match; 
KnmNn or expected detriments to the state or "''"~,a,,., industries in 
the state; 
A detailed description of the estimated new state tax revenues to be 
generated by the project. 
While the Code specifies the categories of information that are to be provided, no 
standards, guidelines, or rules are set out as to how the information is to be used or evaluated by 
the EAC. Its determination as to whether an applicant is entitled to a tax credit is totally 
subjective and within the EAC's administrative discretion. It is therefore not subject to any 
meaningful judicial review. 
conclusion that an entity qualifies for a tax is at once arbitrary and 
capricious, that the EAC alone evaluates all of the information submitted, without any 
required objective criteria for that evaluation, and without findings of fact to 
support its decision. Thus, the EAC has virtually unlimited discretion to grant or deny any 
business's application, regardless of the quality and content of the information submitted. 
Idaho Code §§67-4704(1) and (2) limit the duty of the Director the Department 
Commerce to determining whether the application is complete. it the Director must submit 
the application to the EAC, whose decision to grant or deny a tax credit is conclusive. 
Although provision has been made for judicial review a rejected application by the 
applicant, the law provides that a denial is not considered a "contested case, and the 
law with regard to appeal of an administrative agency decision the court to defer to the 
OPENING BRIEF 
a entity create Even as to one 
however, the Idaho Legislature failed to enact any "standards, guidelines, 
restrictions or qualifications" in the IRJA. As a result, the is the final arbiter with regard to 
whether an entity qualifies for or is denied favorable tax treatment. Without any objective 
standards and requirements, the exercise of EAC's grant of authority is subject to political 
favoritism, corruption and cronyism. 
Plaintiff Employers Resource Management Company, an Idaho Corporation 
("Employers"), is one of Idaho's top privately-held companies. Recently, the EAC granted one of 
Employer's competitors, Paylocity, an Illinois company, a 28% credit against future tax 
liabilities return for its promise to create "new jobs" in Boise. The estimated tax credit granted 
to Paylocity by the EAC is approximately $6,500,000. 
The State of Idaho's grant of a massive tax break to Paylocity has given it an unfair 
economic advantage over Employers, including the ability to lure employees away from 
Employers. Employers has and will suffer damages as a direct and proximate result of the 
actions of the State Department of Commerce alleged herein. Those damages include 
following: 
a) Paylocity is a web-based company. In ar1ticipation of the web 
requirements to effectively compete against Paylocity in Idaho, 
Employers has incurred additional expenses for internet 
competitive software; 
b) Since Paylocity's receipt of tax credits is based in part on the 
number of employees it hires, Employers expects that its key 
employees will be targeted by Paylocity because their 
..... ,,,,,.1"', experience, and existing 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
will incur additional expenses 
expenses to retain clients, 
amount charged for its services to compete with Paylocity. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in its interpretation and application of 
"competitor standing" in this case. 
2. Whether Employers established its standing in this action by alleging an injury 
in fact, fairly traceable to the action of the Economic Advisory Council, 
redressable by this action. 
D. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Article VII, §5 of the Idaho Constitution provides that "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon 
same class of subjects [ and] the legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from 
time to time as shall seem necessary and just 
Idaho State Government cannot interfere with the private market to un-level the playing 
field to favor one business at the expense of its competitors. The Idaho Constitution empowers 
the Legislature to enact exemptions that encourage competition in the marketplace. But 
government cannot selectively legislate tax breaks for favored companies. It cannot pick winners 
and losers among businesses. The Legislature has constitutional authority to enact tax laws that 
benefit businesses generally. But it cannot delegate that constitutional authority to an 
administrative agency by granting it unfettered discretion to choose which company benefits 
from tax breaks. 
The Idaho Reimbursement Incentive Act ("IRIA") does precisely that The Legislature 
OPENING BRIEF 
Employers is one of Idaho's top privately held businesses, providing corporations with 
employee benefit Paylocity, an Illinois business offering similar received a 
$6.5 million tax credit for agreeing to relocate its business to Idaho and compete with Employers 
for the same pool of business. The EAC's action in granting a tax credit to Paylocity allows it to 
provide the same services that Employers already provides at a substantially reduced cost, 
putting Employers at a severe competitive disadvantage. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. EMPLOYERS HAS STANDING TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE STATE'S 
SUBSIDIZATION OF ITS BUSINESS COMPETITOR 
L Employers has suffered an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the EAC's action in 
granting a tax subsidy to Paylocity, its business competitor. 
Employers initiated this lawsuit because the Idaho Department of Commerce exercised 
its discretionary authority under the Tax Reimbursement Incentive Act to grant a subsidy in the 
form of a tax credit to Paylocity, a direct competitor of Employers. The Complaint also alleges 
of granting that tax credit will directly by giving 
Paylocity an unfair economic advantage over Employers, which it can use to undercut 
Employer's pricing, lure its employees away, and can devote its tax savings to marketing and 
advertising expenses to compete for Employer's customers. (Clerk's Record "CR" p. 65, 
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statute 
validity the ... statute, . . and obtain 
a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
"[t]he [Uniform] Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from 
showing that it has standing to bring the action in the first instance. Schneider v. Howe, 142 
Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). 
Idaho 1 
The standard for standing was set forth in Young v. City of Ketchum, I 
103, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 ( 2002): 
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues 
the party wishes to have adjudicated. Van Valkenburgh at 124, 15 
P.3d at 11 Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 
Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (quoting A1iles at 639, 
778 P.2d at 761). To satisfy the case or controversy requirement 
standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and 
a substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or 
redress the claimed injury. Id ( citations omitted). This requires a 
showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged 
conduct ~Miles at 639, 778 P.2d at 761 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under LR.C.P. I2(b)(6) 
only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the 
claim which would entitle it to relief. Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 
1347 (Ct App. 1992). As a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be 
granted only in the unusual case in which the complaint includes allegations showing on the 
the complaint that there is some insunnountable bar to relief. Id. is not whether the 
ultimately but whether the is to to 
BRIEF 
Employers alleged facts in 
standing. 
Complaint that met jurisdictional requirements for 
C. EMPLOYERS HAS COMPETITOR STANDING BASED ON INJURY 
RESULTING FROM THE AGENCY'S ACTION THAT BENEFITTED ITS 
COMPETITOR. 
The lower court ruled that Employers did not have standing because (1) Employers did 
not have a protected legal interest in the marketplace; (2) the government action was directed at 
third parties, for the purpose of increasing competition, and not at and (3) Employers 
alleged only a 
With regard to the holding (1) that Employers did not have a ''protectable legal interest in 
marketplace" because the tax credit granted to Paylocity did not directly injure Employers, 
(CR, p. 81, Afemorandum Decision, p. 6), there are a number of problems. First, whether 
Paylocity's receipt a tax credit will cause economic injury to Employers is a question of fact 
that has yet to be litigated. Second, the test for standing is whether an injury in fact is "fairly 
traceable to the actions of the government," not whether the government action is directed at the 
injured party. Third, the question whether Employers has a protectable legal interest goes to the 
merits, not to the issue of standing, as noted in Sherley v Sebellius, 610 F.3d 69, (D.C. Cir. 
2010), vacated on other grounds by 644 F.3d 388: 
The requirement of a protected competitive interest, however "goes 
to the merits" of a plaintiff's claim, not to his Article III standing. 
Data Serv. US. 
BRIEF 
courts held that the aggrieved business may assert 
to the district court's ruling in 
directed at the complaining party to be actionable, "competitor standing" has been successfully 
asserted with regard to agency action directed at a plaintiff's competitor. The court in Sherley v. 
Sebelius, supra at 72, declared: 
The doctrine of competitor standing addresses the first requirement 
by recognizing that economic actors " suffer [an] injury in fact 
when agencies lift regulatory restrictions on their competitors or 
otherwise allow increased competition" against them. La. Energy 
& Power Auth v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.CCirJ998); 
accord New World Radio, Inc. v. 294 164, 172 
(D.C.Cir.2002) ("basic law of economics" that increased 
competition leads to actual injury); see also Canadian Lumber 
Alliance v. United States, 517 1319, I 
(Fed.Cir.2008) (doctrine of competitor standing " relies on 
economic logic to conclude that a plaintiff will likely suffer an 
injury-in-fact when the government acts in a way that increases 
competition or aids the plaintiffs competitors" ). The form of 
that injury may vary; for example, a seller facing increased 
competition may lose sales to rivals, or be forced to lower its price 
or to expend more resources to achieve the same sales, all to the 
detriment of its bottom line. Because increased competition 
almost surely injures a seller in one form or another, he need not 
wait until "allegedly illegal transactions ... hurt [him} 
competitively" before challenging the regulatory (or, for that 
matter, the deregulatory) governmental decision that increases 
competition. La. Energy, 141 F.3d at 367 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, while increasing competition in general may be a laudable goal, an agency 
cannot pursue that goal by granting preferences to some businesses based on subjective criteria. 
BRIEF 
an Idaho company harmed 
competitors. In Clinton v. City of New York, 
action on tax policy that benefitted 
41 426-27, 118 s. 2091 (1998), the 
Court held that Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., an Idaho cooperative, had "competitor 
standing" to challenge the President's cancellation of a tax benefit that put Snake River at a 
disadvantage with its competitors. The Supreme Court discussed the application of the doctrine 
to Snake River as follows: 
Appellee Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River) was 
formed in May 1997 to assist Idaho potato farmers in marketing 
their crops and stabilizing prices, in part through a strategy of 
acquiring potato processing facilities that will allow the members 
of the cooperative to retain revenues otherwise payable to third-
party processors. At that time, Congress was considering the 
amendment to the capital gains tax that was expressly intended to 
aid farmers· cooperatives in the purchase of processing 
and Snake River had concrete plans to take advantage of the 
amendment if passed. Indeed, appellee Mike Cranney, acting on 
behalf of Snake River, was engaged in negotiations with the owner 
of an Idaho potato processor that would have qualified for the tax 
benefit under the pending legislation, but these negotiations 
terminated when the President canceled §968. Snake River is 
currently considering the possible purchase of other processing 
facilities in Idaho if the President's cancellation is reversed. Based 
on these facts, the District Court concluded that the Snake River 
plaintiffs were injured by the President's cancellation of §968, as 
they "lost the benefit of being on equal footing with their 
competitors and will likely have to pay more to purchase 
processing facilities now that the sellers will not [be] able to take 
advantage of section 968's tax breaks. Id., at 177. City of New York 
v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 177 (D.D.C. 1998). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -13 
Id at 432-33. 
The Snake River also suffered an immediate 
injury when the President canceled the limited tax benefit that 
Congress had enacted to facilitate the acquisition processing 
plants. Three critical facts identify the:; specificity and the:; 
importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted § 968 for the 
specific purpose of providing a benefit to a defined category of 
potential purchasers of a defined category of assets. The members 
of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a 
statutory "bargaining chip" to use in carrying out the congressional 
plan to facilitate their purchase of such assets. Second, the 
President selected §968 as one of only two tax benefits in the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The 
cancellation rested on his determination that the use of those 
bargaining chips would have a significant impact on the federal 
budget deficit. Third, the Snake River cooperative was organized 
for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had 
concrete plans to utilize the benefits of §968, and it was engaged in 
ongoing negotiations with the owner of a processing plant who had 
expressed an interest in structuring a tax-deferred sale when the 
President canceled § 968. Moreover, it is actively searching for 
other processing facilities for possible future purchase if the 
President's cancellation is reversed; and there are ample processing 
facilities in the State that Snake River may be able to purchase. By 
depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation 
inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish 
standing under our precedents. See, e. g., Investment Company 
Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971); 3K. Davis & R. 
Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 13-14 (3d ed. 1994) ("The 
Court routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting 
from {governmental actions} that alter competitive conditions as 
sufficient to satisfy the {Article III 'injury-in-fact' requirement/ . 
. . . fi}t follows logically that any ... petitioner who is likely to 
suffer economic injury as a result of [governmental action/ that 
changes market conditions satisfies this part of the standing 
test''). ( emphasis added) 
OPENING BRIEF 
therefore eligible 
~,u-~,~ .. ~·- telecommunication services in competition with USTA. court stated: 
UST A contends that the FCC's order injures its members by 
making ICN eligible for a subsidy that permits it to offer lower 
prices for the same telecommunications services. We have 
repeatedly recognized that parties "suffer constitutional injury in 
fact when agencies . . allow increased competition" against them. 
Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 
(D.C. Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Wabash Valley Power Ass'n v. FERC, 
268 F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir.2001); MD Phann., Inc. v. Drug 
Eriforcement Admin., 133 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1998). And we 
have likewise recognized that regulatory decisions that permit 
subsidization of some participants in a market can have the 
requisite injurious impact on those participants' competitors. See 
Exxon v. FERC, 182 F.3d 30, 43 1999); 
Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701. 
case was decided by summary 
judgment on the pleadings, UST A had submitted member affidavits showing that it was 
willing and able to compete with ICN. The court remarked that these affidavits were sufficient to 
the remaining two requirements of constitutional standing,"~"''"""' 
[T]he competitive injury suffered by USTA's members is fairly 
traceable to the FCC's decision to render ICN eligible for the 
subsidy, and that iajury would likely be redressed by a favorable 
decision of this court vacating the FCC's order. See High Plains 
Wireless, LP. v. FCC, 276 F.3d 599, 605 (D.C. 2002); Exxon, 
182 F.3d at 43; Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d at 701. We therefore 
conclude that USTA has constitutional standing to seek judicial 




against it would increase and that it would be harmed. 
of Appeals rejected this limitation on standing in Sherley Sebelius, supra: 
This mere possibility of injury does not establish competitor 
standing, argues the Government, which, as did the district court, 
reads our cases to require that a plaintiff asserting competitor 
standing show a challenged agency action will "almost surely 
cause [him] to lose business." El Paso, 50 F.3d at 27. 
As the parties' arguments demonstrate, our cases addressing 
competitor standing have articulated various formulations of the 
standard for determining whether a plaintiff asserting competitor 
standing has been injured. Regardless how we have phrased the 
standard in any particular case, however, the basic requirement 
common to all our cases is that the complainant show an 
actual or imminent increase in competition, which increase we 
recognize will almost certainly cause an injury in fact 
610 F.3d at ( emphasis added). 




were considered by the court. In its Complaint Amended Complaint, 
Employers alleged that the agency's grant of a tax credit to Paylocity, its competitor, would 
increase competition for business on terms favorable to Paylocity and unfavorable to Employers, 
which constituted an imminent and actual threatened injury. 
Employers alleged: 
1. Plaintiff Employers Resource Management an Idaho 
Corporation, ("Employers Resource") is one of Idaho's top privately-held 
companies. Recently, the EAC granted Paylocity, an Illinois company, 
and one Employers' Resource competitors, a against 
OPENING BRIEF 
3. Employers Resource has and will suffer damages as a direct and 
proximate of the actions State Department 
Commerce alleged herein. Those damages include the following: 
(CR., pp. 41-42). 
a) Paylocity is a web-based company. In anticipation of the 
web requirements to effectively compete against 
Paylocity in Idaho, Employers Resource has incurred 
additional expenses for internet competitive software; 
b) Since Paylocity's receipt of tax credits is based in part on 
the number of employees it hires, Employers Resource 
expects that its key employees will be targeted by Paylocity 
because of their training, experience, and familiarity with 
Employers' existing Idaho customer base. Employers will 
incur additional expense in salaries and other benefits to 
retain its key employees; 
Employers anticipates the need to protect 
Idaho business since Paylocity can afford to undercut 
Employers' pricing, in part due to favorable tax 
treatment. Employers will incur expenses advertising and 
marketing expenses to retain its clients. 
The Federal Court of Appeals held in Sherley that the two doctors had competitor 
standing when the agency promulgated new guidelines that authorized the agency to fund more 
action was not directed at two suffered an 
"injury in fact" because the agency action meant increased competition for a limited number of 
grants. Just like those two doctors, Employers will clearly face increased competition in Idaho 
from Paylocity's entry into the marketplace with government assistance. That fact satisfies the 
BRIEF 
to not 
the plaintiff had "competitor standing. However, in virtually every other 
courts. 
Idaho's legal standard for standing is set out in Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 
Idaho , 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996). The Court noted: 
In Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d (1989), 
the Court stated three basic propositions concerning standing that 
guide our decision here: 
1. "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party relief and 
not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. !l 
"[T]o satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, 
litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an and 
a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
or redress the claimed injury." 
3. "[A] citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental 
enactment where the injury is one suffered alike by all and 
taxpayers of the jurisdiction." 
Id. at 641 778 P.2d at 763. 
In the federal courts, a three-part test governs whether a dispute presents a "case or 
controversy" sufficient for Article III standing: ( 1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in 
a legally protected interest is (a) concrete and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of'; and (3) must be likely, as opposed to 
BRIEF 
m a 
" Idaho courts and the federal courts also require a causal connection between the 
challenged action and the injury. The plaintiff's injuries must be different than injuries suffered 
by all citizens and taxpayers in the jurisdiction. 
2. "Competitor standing" flows directly from standing principles applied by Idaho 
courts. 
The federal courts did not create a new body of law or depart from established standing 
to formulate the rule of "competitor standing. The rule flowed directly from the 
pu•vc.-,,vu of the universally applied standing rules to facts that showed government action 
V~<<va.,r, injury to a plaintiff, different from injuries suffered by and taxpayers in 
"competitor standing" to complain of the action in granting a tax subsidy to Employers' 
competitor, Paylocity. The lower court correctly noted that Martin v. County, 150 Idaho 
248 P.3d 1243 (2011), stated that Idaho courts have not recognized "competitor 
standing. But the Martin facts are not remotely similar to the present case, and Martin is 
therefore readily distinguished. First, 1vfartin was a challenge to a zoning amendment applicable 
to undeveloped properties throughout the County. Martin argued that upzoning other properties 
placed his property at a competitive disadvantage because it increased the supply of developable 
properties. The Court in Martin noted: 
None of the parcels that Martin ov.111s -- or 
interests in -- were downzoned as a 
OPENING BRIEF 
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same manner that he would have been able to prior to the 2007 and 
2008 zoning amendments. 
Martin cites to no authority in support of his argument that a 
comprehensive county-wide chai1.ge m zomng designations 
(wherein some parcels of land receive a higher zoning density 
classification than they previously enjoyed) constitutes an injury to 
a property owner, absent some resultant specific and traceable 
harm. Martin argues that the upzoning of approximately 20,000 
acres of property in Camas County will decrease the value of his 
property for development, because of the increase in supply. 
Martin contends that Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise 
Auditorium District, 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624 (2005), stands 
for the proposition that an increase in competition may constitute a 
particularized injury. 
Id at 513, 748 P3d at 1248. 
In present case, the agency action is not action directed at all businesses or public 
Paylocity, 
competitor. Employers has not alleged that goverument action has altered the marketplace 
increasing competition generally and equally for everyone, but that the government 
subsidized Employers' competitor so that Paylocity can compete "F.'-'-'"·"" Employers an 
advantageous position artificially created by the State. This is a particularized injury unique to 
Employers. 
With regard to the lower court's statement that competitor standing exists only when a 
successful challenge will set up an absolute bar to competition, Employers asserts that a 
successful challenge to the EAC's grant of a tax credit to Paylocity will achieve the end that 
Paylocity would have to with Employers on an equal 




D'Alene Tribe v. Denney, 169, 2015 Idaho 
demonstrated a "distinct and palpable injury" sufficient to confer 
In that case, the Court reiterated the Martin v. Camas County holding that "increased 
competition alone is insufficent to confer standing," but then clarified that if the tribe had pointed 
to facts "to show actual or imminent losses of profit or rights greater than the average citizen," 
the tribe would have demonstrated a "distinct and palpable" injury sufficient to confer standing. 
The rationale applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe case is 
consistent with the "competitor standing" rules formulated by the United 
in Clinton and followed by other federal courts in Sherley and US Telecom. 
Court 
In Clinton, the Court held that Snake River Farms had standing to bring a claim 
challenging action by the executive branch of the federal government that placed it at a 
disadvantage with its competitors. In the present case, the executive branch of the State of Idaho, 
the Department of Commerce, has taken action that has put Employers at an economic 
disadvantage with one of its competitors. 
In both Clinton and this case, the legislative branch of government has created a tax 
benefit that was supposed to be available to all companies. In this case, the Idaho Legislature 
invested the Department Commerce with so much discretion in the administration of the law 
that its actions exceed its constitutional authority. 




Based on the foregoing, Employers has standing to bring this action, and this Court 
should reverse the decision of the district court, and remand this action for consideration of the 
merits of Employers' claims. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of January, 2017. 
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